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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DIVISION
OF PROPERTY UPON DIVORCE
JAMES N. CASTLEBERRY, JR.*
PRE-Eggemeyer STATUTORY EVOLUTION AND COURT CONSTRUCTION
OF SECTION 3.63, TEXAS FAMILY CODE

The recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Eggemeyer v.
Eggemeyer' is a welcome breath of fresh air in the musty atmosphere of over 100 years of erroneous decisions of intermediate appellate courts regarding the discretionary power of a court in a divorce
proceeding to make a division of the property of the spouses. These
pre-Eggemeyer decisions can be attributed in part to several different, but related, reasons which will be discussed. Nevertheless, the
issue resolved by the limited decision in Eggemeyer is only "the tip
of the iceberg." ' Several important questions concerning the power
of a court in a divorce proceeding to make valid orders affecting
the property rights of the spouses remain unanswered. Can a court
divest one of the parties of separate personal property and vest it
in the other? Is the court required to make an equal partition of the
community property? May the court utilize a basic partnership accounting approach in settling the property rights of the spouses
upon termination of the marriage by divorce? Should courts continue to apply equitable principles of reimbursement to enable
each party to recover any equitable claims against a community or
separate property interest of a spouse which has been improved or
enhanced at the expense of the separate estate of the other spouse
or the community? Could a court, in a "fault" divorce proceeding
award damages for breach of the marriage "contract" as against the
party who breached it?
The decision in Eggemeyer was a response to the question
whether the provisions of section 3.63 of the Texas Family Code
authorize a trial court to divest a spouse of separate realty upon
divorce. 3 The statutory provision dealing with the authority of a
* J.D., St. Mary's University; Dean and Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School
of Law, San Antonio, Texas.
1. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977), noted in 9 ST. MARY's L.J. 331 (1977).
2. The decision is confined to the issue of the power of a court in a divorce proceeding
to divest a spouse of separate real property in the exercise of the authority granted in TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975).
3. See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex. 1977) (construing TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975)).
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divorce court to divide and dispose of the property of the parties was
originally enacted in 1841.' It expressly prohibited a divorce court
from divesting title to realty. Over a hundred years later, the Texas
Supreme Court finally interpreted the identical prohibition in a
successor statute5 to apply only to separate realty.' When this statutory provision was enacted as section 3.63 of the Texas Family
Code, effective January 1, 1970, the language expressly prohibiting
divestiture of title to realty was omitted and the extent of the power
of a court to divide the property became uncertain.' Professor
McKnight, who served on the State Bar of Texas committee which
prepared the proposals for the codification of Texas family law,
contended that the omission of the prohibition was inadvertent. He
emphasized that the commentary that was prepared by the committee to accompany the proposed codification when presented to the
legislature stated that the Code adopted the then existing law.8 The
Corpus Christi Court of Civil Appeals, in Ramirez v. Ramirez,,
agreed with Professor McKnight, and held that section 3.63 should
be construed as an enactment of existing law which prohibited the
divestment of title to separate realty.' 0 The contrary view was
adopted by the Dallas and Tyler Courts of Civil Appeals." Apparently convinced that the legislature intentionally omitted the prohibition and meant to change the existing law, these courts held that
4. See 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4, at 20, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 484 (1898). Prior to the adoption of section 3.63 the statutes had

always contained the prohibition that "[niothing herein shall be construed to compel either
party to divest himself or herself of the title to real estate." See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4638
(1925); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4634 (1911); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2980 (1895); Tex. Civ.
Stat. art. 2864 (1879); 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4, at
20, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 484 (1898). The sentence was construed to prohibit divestiture of separate real property only. Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 376, 331 S.W.2d 299, 303
(1960); accord, Reardon v. Reardon, 163 Tex. 605, 607, 359 S.W.2d 329, 330 (1962). TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975) omits the statutory prohibition and provides: "In a decree
of divorce or annulment the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner
that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any
children of the marriage." See Comment, Divisionof MaritalProperty on Divorce: A Proposal
to Revise Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 204 (1975).
5. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4638 (1925).
6. Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 376, 331 S.W.2d 299, 303 (1960).
7. See 554 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. 1977).
8. See McKnight, Commentary to Title I, Texas Family Code, 5 TEx. TECH L. REv.
281, 337 (1974); McKnight, Matrimonial Property,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J.
27, 39 (1973).
9. 524 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
10. Id. at 768-69.
11. See Baxla v. Baxla, 522 S.W.2d 736, 739-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ);
Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52, 56-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
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a court had power under section 3.63 to divide any property owned
by the parties, including separate realty, in such manner as the
court deemed to be fair, just and equitable. 2
In Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer" the Texas Supreme Court cited
Ramirez with approval, referring to it as a "well reasoned decision,"'" and, after carefully reviewing the legislative history of section 3.63, determined that the legislature had intended to enact the
Family Code as a codification of existing law and that therefore,
section 3.63 must be construed as prohibiting a court from divesting
the title to separate realty.'"
Interesting semantic gymnastics, typically used to substitute
form in the place of substance, enabled the courts to avoid the
prohibition against divestiture of separate realty. In some cases this
resulted in the idea that the court in a divorce proceeding could
subject the separate real property of one spouse to a life estate in
favor of the other spouse to insure support of such spouse after the
divorce." The rationale was that such a decree did not actually
divest the title to realty, but merely subjected the income, rents,
and revenues from the property to the support of the other spouse.' 7
The possible application of the "open mine doctrine" under this
approach could easily leave the owner of the legal title with nothing
but an empty shell.' 8 It is at such times that one recalls the observation of Lord Coke: "But what is the land but the profits thereof."' 9
Other decisions upheld the power of a divorce court to impose a
trust on a spouse's separate realty for support of the other spouse
subsequent to the divorce. 0 Another approach was to place an equi12. Baxla v. Baxla, 522 S.W.2d 736, 739-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ);
Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52, 56-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
13. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
14. Id. at 138.
15. Id. at 139. Three reasons for this determination were cited. First, the legislative
commentary considered section 3.63 to be a codification of present law. Id. at 139. Second,
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05 (Vernon 1975) specifically authorizes property of a spouse to
be set aside for the support of the child without authorizing such for the other spouse. Finally,
section 3.63 contains the language "estate of the parties," not "estates." There is only one
estate, namely the community. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. 1977).
16. See Keton v. Clark, 67 SW.2d 437, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1933, writ ref'd).
17. Id. at 439.
18. The open mine doctrine authorizes a life tenant to work all mines that were in
existence when the life estate commenced. See Youngman v. Shular, 155 Tex. 437, 438-39,
288 S.W.2d 495, 496 (1956); White v. Blackman, 168 S.W.2d 531, 533-34 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
19. 1 E. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITrLETON 45 (London 1794).

20. See, e.g., Ex parte Scott, 133 Tex. 1, 14, 123 S.W.2d 306, 313 (1939); Fitts v. Fitts,
14 Tex. 443, 447-48, 453 (1855); Keene v. Keene, 445 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
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table lien on the separate realty of one spouse to insure the payment
of an award of money to the other divorced spouse.' These decisions
expressed the view that the imposition of a lien on the separate
realty did not constitute a divestment of the title, but simply made
the amount of the monetary award a charge against the separate
realty until it was paid." It may be argued that such a lien does not
per se operate as a divestiture and that the divestment through
foreclosure would result from the voluntary act of refusal to pay the
debt which is secured by the lien. As Professor McKnight has
pointed out, however, the lien is an interest in the property itself,
and foreclosure of the lien would constitute complete divestiture of
title. The contention has also been made that the imposition of a
trust or a lien should be deemed against public policy because it
restrains the alienation of the realty which is subjected to it.2 4 Dictum in Eggemeyer indicates that some of this discretion may no
longer be permitted. Commenting on language in Hedtke v.
Hedtke6 the court stated that Hedtke was overbroad in holding a
husband owed a duty of support to the divorced wife, as well as the
children. 6
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

Having interpreted the intention of the legislature in enacting
section 3.63 to statutorily prohibit the divestment of separate realty,
the Eggemeyer court considered the applicability of two separate
provisions of the Texas Constitution to the power of a court under
section 3.63 to divest the separate property of a spouse. 27 First,
article XVI, section 15, of the Texas Constitution defines separate
1969, writ dism'd); Pape v. Pape', 35 S.W. 479, 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ dism'd). See
also Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposalto Revise Section 3.63, 7
ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 212-13 (1975).
21. See, e.g., Simons v. Simons, 23 Tex. 344, 348 (1859); In re Marriage of Jackson, 506
S.W.2d 261, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ dism'd); Mozisek v. Mozisek, 365
S.W.2d 669, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963, writ dism'd).
22. See Hursey v. Hursey, 165 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1942, writ
dism'd).
23. McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413,
446-47 (1976).
24. Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to Revise Section
3.63, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 209, 224-25 (1975).
25. 112 Tex. 404, 409, 248 S.W. 21, 22 (1923).
26. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. 1977). The Eggemeyer court
expressly stated that a parent's separate property may be subjected to a duty of support for
the children. Id. at 142.
27. Id. at 140-41.
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property, and that definition is exclusive." Making a broad reference to all separate property the court stated: "If one spouse's separate property may by a divorce decree be changed from the separate
property of the one spouse into the separate property of the other,
there is a type of separate property which is not embraced within
the constitutional definition of the term." 9 It is, of course, well
established that the legislature has no power to add to, or subtract
from, the exclusive constitutional modes of creating separate property, and any attempt by the legislature to do so is unconstitutional
and void.?' The reasoning of the majority was that since the constitution does not specifically and expressly authorize the creation of
separate property of one spouse by judicially divesting such property from the other spouse in a divorce proceeding, the property
must necessarily retain its status as the separate property of the
spouse who owned it. The court observed: "The nature of property
is fixed by the Texas Constitution, and not by what is just and
right.' Culpability may, despite no-fault divorce, be a basis for the
dissolution of a marriage, but it is no basis for a redefinition of
property at variance with the Texas Constitution." 3 ' The dissent in
Eggemeyer criticized the majority's view that the constitutional definition is exclusive.32 Case law decisions were cited in support of the
contention that courts had recognized the valid classification of
separate property created in a manner other than the constitutionally prescribed methods. However, the decisions cited concerned
cases of mutations of separate property,33 and post-marriage increases in the value of separate property.34 The dissent also cited the
statutory provision which declares that the separate property of a
spouse includes the recovery for personal injuries other than loss of
earnings sustained by the spouse during marriage. 5 The error in the
28. Id. at 140 (citing Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. 1972); Arnold v.
Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925)). See also Huie, The Texas ConstitutionalDefinition of the Wife's Separate Property, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 1054, 1057-58 (1957).
29. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977); see McKnight, Division
of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413, 444 (1976).
30. See Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1966); Hilley v. Hilley, 161
Tex. 569, 573-74, 342 S.W.2d 565, 567-68 (1961); Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 539-40, 273
S.W. 799, 802 (1925).
31. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977) (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 146-47 (dissenting opinion).
33. Id. at 146 (dissenting opinion) (citing Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6 (1851) (slave
purchased with separate funds was separate)).
34. Id. at 146 (dissenting opinion) (citing Stringfellow v. Sorrells, 82 Tex. 277, 18 S.W.
689 (1891) (increase in size of separate livestock not community)).
35. Id. at 146 (dissenting opinion) (citing TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a) (Vernon 1975)).
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dissent's contention is that the mutation of separate funds by purchase, the fattening of a mule, or damages for loss of a hand do not
require a reclassification of the property as separate or community.
The property which had been previously classified as separate or
community property has merely taken a new form or has had its
value enhanced, and the owner's rights in the res remain the same.
The constitutional problem envisioned by the court in this regard
seems to be predicated on the theory that the divestment and investment of the property as a result of the court's division of property in a divorce proceeding occurs during the marriage while the
parties are still husband and wife. One commentator has suggested
that in resolving the problem, it must be determined which aspect
of the court's decree occurs first, the divorce of the parties or the
division of the property. 3 Under the Eggemeyer majority opinion,
the parties are still married at the time the court acts under section
3.63, and therefore, the constitutional definition, which is applicable only to a "wife," controls the classification of any property
owned or acquired at any time by a "wife." In like manner, when
the court acts under section 3.63, the statutory definition of separate
property applicable-to property owned or acquired by a "spouse"
must be applied. It seems that such an approach would be equally
applicable to both separate and community property. The result
would be that the court in a divorce proceeding would have no power
to divest title to the separate or community property of either
spouse and transfer the title thereto to the other spouse as his or her
separate property because to do so would constitute an attempt to
create separate property of the spouses in a mode not authorized by
the constitution and statutes.
It seems obvious, however, that neither the constitutional nor the
statutory classification should be applied to property that one acquires in a judicial proceeding, the purpose of which is to dissolve a
marriage and terminate the status of the parties as spouses. The
view embraced by the majority opinion would fix the status of property acquired in a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage on the
same basis as though the property were acquired during the marriage when the parties are working together as husband and wife in
joint efforts to acquire property. It would determine the classification of property acquired in a proceeding to remove one's status as
a "wife" or "spouse" as though such was not the real nature or
36. 14 Hous. L. REv. 1104, 1112-13 (1977).
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purpose of the proceeding. It would apply constitutional and statutory classifications of property rights blindly and without regard to
the basic policy considerations that are intended to be served by
them. It would completely disregard the fact that the division of the
"estate of the parties" by the court under section 3.63 is an integral
part of one single judgment in which the court both grants the
divorce and makes the division of the property and that the entire
judgment becomes effective at the same moment. 37 Thus, the property divison directed by section 3.63 does not in fact invest the
parties with the property during their marriage but rather at the
moment that their marriage is terminated. Since the property thus
acquired by the parties would be acquired "upon the divorce of the
parties" it would not be acquired as a "wife" or "spouse" and consequently neither the constitutional nor the statutory classifications
of property acquired during marriage would be applicable.
The second view, adopted by the dissenting opinion states, without explanation or citation of supporting authority, that "the property division directed by Section 3.63 occurs after the divorce of the
parties, and Article 16, Section 15, providing for the initial characterization of property, does not control this situation." This approach avoids the constitutional problem dealt with by the majority
opinion, and leaves the divorce court unhampered by any constitutional definitions or classification of the rights of parties who acquire property in the divorce proceeding under section 3.63. The
same would also be true of the statutory definitions and classification under this view. However, this approach seems to be based on
an erroneous conception of the nature and scope of the judgment of
a divorce court under section 3.63. The error here is essentially the
same error as made in the majority opinion, but made in a different
way. Both views fail to properly treat the judgment of the court
granting the divorce and making a division of the "estate of the
parties" as one integrated action in which each part becomes effective and operative at the same moment. It seems rather unique that
both views reach their respective results by the same erroneous
premise, that the divorce of the parties and the division of their
property are not integral parts of a single court order, but are based
37. See, e.g., Ex parte Scott, 133 Tex. 1, 14, 123 S.W.2d 306, 313 (1939); Carter v. Carter,
336 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960, no writ); Pelham v. Sanders, 290 S.W.2d
684, 687-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1956, no writ).
38. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 146 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion)
(emphasis added).
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on different concepts of the status of the parties at the time the
divorce court makes its division of the "estate of the parties" under
section 3.63. The identical result can also be produced by applying
the correct legal basis. The court could recognize that the parties
before the court are seeking the dissolution of their marriage and are
no longer acting together in joint efforts to acquire property. Additionally, the property which they acquire as a result of the court's
division of the "estate of the parties" under section 3.63 is not acquired before the divorce, or after the divorce, but at the moment
of divorce. Furthermore, the parties do not have status as a "wife"
or "spouse" at the time of such acquisition; therefore, the constitutional and statutory definitions and classifications of property are
not intended to be, and are not, applicable.
The second, and most significant, ground on which the court
based its decision in Eggemeyer is that of "substantive due
course." 39 The court observed that "[tlhe protection of one's right
to own property is said to be one of the most important purposes of
government. That right has been described as fundamental, natural, inherent, inalienable, not derived from the legislature and as
preexisting even constitutions."10 Pointing out that the Texas Constitution provides that no citizen of Texas may be deprived of his
property "except by the due course of the law of the land,"', the
court emphasized that due course protection requires substantive as
well as procedural due course. The court also quoted the language
of the United States Supreme Court in Thompson v. Consolidated
Gas Utilities Corp.:" "[Olne person's property may not be taken
for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public
purpose, even though compensation be paid."44
This statement of basic constitutional law was quoted and relied
upon by the Texas Supreme Court in Marrs v. Railroad
Commission.4" There, the court held that the operational result of
the production proration allowable order of the Railroad Commission was to reduce plaintiff's production so as to cause the oil in
39. Id. at 140.
40. Id. at 140.
41. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 states: "No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life,
liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised except by the due
course of the law of the land."
42. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977) (citing TEX. CONST. art.
I, § 19, comment (Vernon 1955)).
43. 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937).
44. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. 1977).
45. 142 Tex. 293, 305, 177 S.W.2d 941, 949 (1944).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss1/3

8

Castleberry: Constitutional Limitations on the Division of Property upon Divor

1978]

DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY

plaintiff's tract to migrate to an adjoining neighbor's tract where it
could be, and was, produced. Thus, the effect of the order was to
take the private property of the plaintiff and give it to the defendant
in violation of the constitutional prohibition." It is important to
note that the language of the United States Supreme Court in
Thompson makes it clear that before the private property of a person can be taken, two conditions precedent must exist: (1) there
must be a justifying public purpose, and (2) compensation must be
paid.47 In Marrs, and in Thompson, the necessity for regulation of
the production of oil and gas in the interest of the public health,
safety, and general welfare provided the basis for the valid exercise
of the police power, but the result of the orders went beyond a mere
"regulation of the use of property" and amounted to a taking without compensation."
In spite of the rather obvious attempt by the supreme court to
point out to trial courts the basic constitutional limitation to the
authority of courts under section 3.63 of the Family Code, some
post-Eggemeyer courts of civil appeals decisions have refused to
recognize either the constitutional limitations or the available alternatives. 9 They have continued to blindly follow the pre-Eggemeyer
precedent which, for over a hundred years, has incorrectly failed to
apply the rudimentary constitutional premise that the legislature
has no power to either impliedly or expressly authorize a trial court
to divest one spouse of property, of any classification whatsoever,
and transfer such property to the other spouse "except by the due
course of the law of the land." Some of these decisions have continued to apply the pre-Eggemeyer interpretation of section 3.63 to
separate personal property, thus making a distinction between the
statutory power of the trial court under section 3.63 to divest title
to separate personal property and the power to divest separate
realty ° This distinction is erroneous because it fails to recognize
46. Id. at 305, 177 S.W.2d at 949.
47. See Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937).
48. See id. at 79; Marrs v. Railroad Comm'n, 142 Tex. 293, 305, 177 S.W.2d 941, 949
(1944).
49. See Muns v. Muns, No. 19439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, May 23, 1978) (not yet
reported); Posey v. Posey, 561 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ); Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 557 S.W.2d 587, 588-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ dism'd);
Musslewhite v. Musslewhite, 555 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ dism'd).
50. See Posey v. Posey, 561 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ);
Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 557 S.W.2d 587, 588-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-VWaco 1977, writ
dism'd); Musslewhite v. Musslewhite, 555 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ
dism'd).
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that the scope and extent of the authority of the trial court under
section 3.63 is subject to constitutional limitations and prohibitions
which apply to all property, real and personal, separate and community, without regard to the purported authority conferred by the
statute. The most significant single point in the Eggemeyer decision
is the Texas Supreme Court's recognition that the action of the trial
court in divesting the husband of his undivided one-third separate
property interest in the family farm and transferring his title to his
wife "was not grounded upon the police power; consequently, the
taking . . . would not have been a constitutional act even if the
legislature had expressly authorized the divestiture of one person's
property and its vesting in another person."5'
While it is true that the only issue before the supreme court in
Eggemeyer was whether a trial court may, in a divorce decree, divest
one spouse of separate realty and transfer title to such property to
the other spouse, it seems clear that the constitutional prohibition
which the court found applicable to separate realty is not confined
to that class of property, but is equally applicable to all property."
Properly understood and applied, the term "property" means, and
includes all rights in things, and therefore, is not the res, but the
right in the res.53 Thus, the property which is protected from divestiture, except by substantive as well as procedural due course, includes "all rights in things," without regard to classification as separate realty, separate personalty, community realty or community
personalty. None of such property is exempt from this protection
under the Texas Constitution. The similar protection of property
afforded by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
is also applicable under the fourteenth amendment, to state action.
THE CONFUSING INFLUENCE OF COMMON LAW AND EQUITY ON TEXAS

COMMUNITY PROPERTY RIGHTS

Part of the problem in correctly construing section 3.63 and the
predecessor statutes has been the failure, or refusal, of courts to
recognize and apply the correct legal principles which must be applied to property rights of the spouses in a divorce proceeding in
Texas. To quote Mr. Justice Holmes' remark in another setting:

51. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. 1977) (emphasis added).

52. See

TEX. CONST.

art. I,

§ 19.

53. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Fuller, 63 Tex. 467, 469 (1885).
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"[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic."5 4 The original
predecessor statute5 5 was passed by a legislature comprised largely
of immigrants to Texas from jurisdictions where the courts applied
common law principles in disposing of property upon divorce. Moreover, the trial and appellate judges who construed and applied the
statute were products of the training and influence of common law
concepts of property rights. At common law, the courts applied the
Judeo-Christian theory that the marriage of the husband. and wife
resulted in a merger of their identities into one person-the husband. The legal title to property acquired by their joint efforts during marriage was vested in the husband, wtio had full power to
manage, control, and dispose of it, except the dower rights of the
wife. 6 As between husband and wife, however, the wife owned an
equitable right, title and interest in such property.57
While Texas adopted the common law as the rule of decision,5" it
refused to adopt it as a rule of property law. Instead, Texas adopted
the civil law community property system. 9 Historically, the community property system was the basis upon which the Mexican and
Spanish governments, prior to the establishment of the Republic of
Texas, recognized and enforced property rights in the geographic
area now known as Texas. ° Under the civil law community property
system, the marriage of a husband and wife did not cause their
identities to merge, but rather resulted in the creation of a partnership for the duration of the marriage."' All property acquired during
the marriage was presumed to have been acquired as a result of the
joint and equal efforts of the spouses, who owned it in equal undivided shares. 2 All property which a spouse owned prior to marriage,
and that which a spouse acquired during the marriage by gift or
inheritance was deemed the separate property of such spouse, since
such acquisition was clearly not attributable to joint efforts by the
spouses in the acquisition of property. 3 Upon termination of the
marriage, either by death or by divorce, the separate property of the
54. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
55. 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4, at 20, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 484 (1898).
56. L. SIMPKINS, SPEER'S TEXAS FAMILY LAW § 12:2 (5th ed. 1976).
57. Id.
58. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1836).
59. See TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 19 (1845).
60. Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex. 621, 625-27 (1846).
61. See L. SIMPKINS, SPEER'S TEXAS FAMILY LAW § 12:2 (5th ed. 1976).
62. See Hardee v. Vincent, 136 Tex. 99, 102, 147 S.W.2d 1072, 1073 (1941).
63. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
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spouses was returned or delivered to the spouse who owned it, and
the community property was partitioned in such manner as would
insure each spouse getting one-half of the entire value of such property.64 The dissolution of the marriage was treated as a dissolution
of the partnership, and the approach to the disposition of the property owned by the spouses at that time was essentially the same
approach as would have been applicable to the disposition of the
assets of any partnership. 5 Thus, the disposition of property of the
spouses upon divorce was entirely consistent with the nature and
scope of the rights of the spouses under the applicable law. It is,
indeed, unfortunate that the early Texas courts and decisions failed
to recognize and apply the basic community property partnership
rights approach to the disposition of property on hand at the time
of divorce. If basic partnership principles are applied upon dissolution of the marriage by divorce, the court, under section 3.63, could
compel an "accounting" between the spouses as partners during
their marriage. Debts and claims as between them could be alleged,
contested, proved, determined, and provisions made for the satisfaction of them as could be done in the case of any other partnership
accounting. Such an approach would accord each spouse the kind
of due process that is required as a basis for the exercise of the power
of the trial court under section 3.63.
THE "DIVISION"

OF THE "ESTATE OF THE PARTIES"

A contributing factor to the erroneous approach to the power of
the court under section 3.63 of the Family Code has been the misinterpretation of that section's phrase "estate of the parties" to include any and all property, separate or community, owned by the
spouses at the time of divorce. 6 The Eggemeyer decision pointed out
that the statute does not authorize a division of the "estates" of the
parties, but only the "estate" of the parties, and "[tihe only 'estate
of the parties' is community property."6 Thus, the authority of a
64. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 226 (2d ed. 1971).
65. See United States v. Stapf, 309 F.2d 592, 600 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion);
Rompel v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D. Tex.), rev'd, 326 U.S. 367 (1945);
Newland v. Newland, 529 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ dism'd).
A commentator has likened the theory of dissolution of marriage in California to the dissolution of a business partnership. Grant, How Much of a Partnershipis Marriage?,23 HASTINGS
L.J. 249, 250 (1971).
66. See, e.g., Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 248 S.W. 21, 22 (1923); Dorfman v.
Dorfman, 457 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970, no writ); Earnest v. Earnest, 223 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, no writ).
67. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. 1977). The court stated that
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trial court on divorce, under section 3.63, to make a division of the
"estate of the parties" is limited to community property. This construction of the statute is certainly a logical one. In order for the
court to "divide" property belonging to the parties, it seems reasonable to assume that the parties must have a joint or undivided
interest in the property which the court is authorized to divide.
The statute does not purport to authorize the court to "divest"
the property of the parties, but only to "divide" such property. 8
Obviously, the statute envisions a partition of property in which the
spouses own undivided interests. It is well settled law that a partition is not a conveyance of the property or divestiture of the rights
of the owners therein. 9
The pre-Eggemeyer Texas decisions governing division of the
community property are not only inconsistent with the historical
origins, policy and rationale of the civil law theory, but are also
incorrect in their interpretation of the legal consequences of a division of the community. Prior to Hailey v. Hailey,T°courts apparently
believed that in order to allow the trial court authority to "divide"
the community unequally so that more than one-half of the community realty could be awarded to one spouse it was necessary to
find that such action was not a divestment of the other spouse's title
to real estate. This was true because of the then express statutory
prohibition denying a divorce court the right to "compel either party
to divest himself or herself of the title to real estate."', The early
decision in Tiemann v. Tiemann2 held that a decree granting all of
a community property homestead to the wife was invalid since it
divested the husband of his title.73 Unfortunately, the correct rationale and result of the Tiemann decision was subsequently changed
by the court's decision in Hailey74 which held that division of the
"[u]nder former article 4638, we construed 'the estate of the parties' to mean community
property." Id. at 139 (citing Reardon v. Reardon, 163 Tex. 605, 359 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. 1962);
Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 331 S.W.2d 299 (1960); Mansfield v. Mansfield, 308 S.W.2d
80 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1958, writ dism'd)); see McKnight, Commentary to Title I,
Texas Family Code, 5 TEx. TECH L. REv. 337 (1974).
68. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975) authorizes "a division of the estate of the

parties." (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., Houston Oil Co. v. Kirkindall, 136 Tex. 103, 109, 145 S.W.2d 1074, 1077
(1941); Chace v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 558, 32 S.W. 520, 522 (1895); Spires v. Hoover, 466
S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
70. 160 Tex. 372, 331 S.W.2d 299 (1960).
71. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4638 (1925).
72. 34 Tex. 522 (1871).
73. Id. at 525.
74. 160 Tex. 372, 331 S.W.2d 299 (1960).
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community in a divorce decree was merely a partition and not a
conveyance divesting either spouse of title. 5 Thereafter, the court
in Reardon v.Reardon" reaffirmed Hailey and held the statutory
prohibition inapplicable even though all of the community realty
was decreed to one of the spouses. 7 The constitutionality of the trial
court's action was not questioned. The basis for the Hailey decision
was the rule governing partition suits between joint owners of interests in realty." Reliance in divorce cases, however, on the basic
rationale underlying the rule applied in non-divorce partition cases
is clearly a distortion. In a typical non-divorce partition decree, the
court vests each of the joint owners with separate ownership of a
portion of the common tract. This is not treated as a conveyance or
divestment; it is considered to be merely a partition of possession
and not title." A non-divorce partition "has the effect only to dissolve the tenancy in common, and leave the title as it was before,
except to locate such rights as the parties may have, respectively,
in the distinct parts of the premises, and to extinguish such rights
in all other portions of that property." 0 Again it is said that
"[p]artition of land means the division of it according to quantity
and value in proportionto the interest of each owner.""' Where the
tract is not susceptible of a partition in kind, the partition by sale
and division of the proceeds, or by owelty must be accomplished in
a manner which will insure that each owner of interest in the property receives his or her pro rata share of the value of their right
therein.8" In a partition of community property by a divorce court
under the present state of Texas case law, however, the decree frequently is made without regard to the proportionate one-half undivided interest of each owner in the property. In such cases, the
operational effect of the decree does not preserve the title, or interest, or value thereof, of each of the joint or common owners of
community property interests, and does not partition to each owner
75. Id. at 376, 331 S.W.2d at 303.
76. 163 Tex. 605, 359 S.W.2d 329 (1962).
77. Id. at 607, 359 S.W.2d at 330.
78. See Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 376-77, 331 S.W.2d 299, 303 (1960) (citing Chace
v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 32 S.W. 520 (1895)).
79. E.g., Houston Oil Co. v. Kirkindall, 136 Tex. 103, 109, 145 S.W.2d 1074, 1077 (1941);
Chace v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 558, 32 S.W. 520, 522 (1895); Spires v. Hoover, 466 S.W.2d 344,
347 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, writ ref d n.r.e.).
80. Chace v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 558, 32 S.W. 520, 522 (1895) (emphasis added).
81. Zanderson v. Sullivan, 91 Tex. 499, 502, 44 S.W. 484, 485 (1898) (emphasis added).
82. See White v. Smyth, 147 Tex. 272, 279, 214 S.W.2d 967, 973 (1948) (sale); Sayers v.
Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 62-63, 161 S.W.2d 769, 772 (1942) (owelty).
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a divided or segregated interest of equal value in a segregated tract.
On the contrary, such a decree actually divests the property rights
of a spouse. The very objectives of the two types of partitions are in
opposition. In a non-divorce partition, the intent is to sever the
undivided possession of the joint owners and enable each to hold an
exclusive possession to a segregated part of the tract.8 3 In a partition
on divorce, the court is primarily interested in achieving an equitable distribution of the entire community property. The law encourages partition suits 5 because they promote the productivity of cotenants by guaranteeing to each his own rights in the property. 6
. The present Texas decisional law that condones the division of
community property by partition upon divorce into unequal portions or shares because of the unequal comparative age, earning
capacity, or other factors unrelated to the ownership rights of the
respective spouses is contradictory to the basic policy underlying
the use of partition between the owners of undivided interests in
property. Moreover, the rationale of the decision in Eggemeyer indicates that such action, under section 3.63, is an unconstitutional
divestment of property. 7
Significantly, court decisions and legislative enactments recognize and protect a spouse's one-half interest in the community property at all times except upon divorce. During the marriage, each
spouse is given sole management of certain forms of community,
such as personal earnings and income from his or her separate property. 8 Neither spouse may contract with respect to the community
83. Irons v. Fort Worth Sand & Gravel Co., 284 S.W.2d 215, 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
84. See TEX. F~Am. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975). The partitioning court in a nondivorce suit may adjust the equities. See Spires v. Hoover, 466 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). These equities, however, are of a different nature from
those adjusted by a divorce court. An example would be reimbursement to a cotenant for
expenditures incurred in improving the property, not consideration of disparity in earning
capacity, age or fault. Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to
Revise Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 209, 215-16 (1975).
85. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6082 (Vernon 1970) gives all cotenants an absolute
right to partition.
86. Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein Bldg. Corp., 442 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1969, no writ).
87. See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. 1977) (citing TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 19).
88. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(a) (Vernon 1975). The special community is now usually
referred to as sole management community and is defined by the statute as that which the
spouse "would have owned if single...." Id. Included are "personal earnings; revenue from
separate property; recoveries for personal injures; and the increase and mutations of, and the
revenue from
.
special community. Id.
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property committed by law to the other's sole management.8 9 In
addition, a transaction by one spouse regarding the joint community is binding only upon the contracting spouse and only to the
extent of that spouse's interest."0 In Cooper v. Texas Gulf Industries,
Inc.,91 it was pointed out that with respect to management, a spouse
"stands in the'same position as any other joint owner of property." 92
The court also observed that "[tihe rights of the wife, like the
rights of the husband and the rights of any other joint owner, may
be affected only by a suit in which the wife is called to answer." 9
Juxtaposed against these statements is the sometimes expressed
opinion that in a divorce partition "[n]either the husband nor the
wife is entitled, as a matter of right, to their interest in the community estate."9 4 The law also recognizes and protects a deceased
spouse's one-half undivided interest in, and share of, the community property. The Texas Probate Code preserves to the children
of a deceased spouse that partner's one-half of the community estate. 5 This is true even though there may be a disparity between
the deceased spouse and the surviving spouse in earning capacity,
age, fault or financial well-being. 6 The illogic of having the two
rules, one for divorce and one for probate administration, is best
illustrated by Pritchardv. Estate of Tuttle.9 7 There, a divorce suit
was pending but the husband had the good foresight to die before
the pending divorce proceeding could be concluded. The court held
that it had no authority or discretion to divide the deceased husband's one-half interest in the community, such wide discretion
being limited to a divorce proceeding.98
A similar rule is applicable where a divorce court fails to dispose
89. Jamail v. Thomas, 481 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 205 (Tex. 1974); Williams v.
Saxon, 521 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). These cases
represent a change from the old rule that, in the absence of fraud, the husband has the right
of sole disposition of the nonhomestead community. See Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545,
548, 359 S.W.2d 48, 50 (1962).
91. 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974).
92. Id. at 202.
93. Id. at 202.
94. Roberts v. Roberts, 535 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
95. TEx. Pao.' CODE ANN. § 45 (Vernon 1956); see Valdez v. Ramirez, 558 S.W.2d 88,
90 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ granted).
96. See Comment, Division of MaritalProperty on Divorce: A Proposalto Revise Section
3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 224 (1975).
97. 534 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
98. Id. at 950.
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of all the community property. In such situations, the divorced parties become tenants in common, each owning equal undivided interests in the property." Any "equities" which might have existed at
the time of the divorce proceeding vanish, and the wide discretion
to divide the property in consideration of one spouse's fault, age, or
earning capacity ceases. The present state of the case law in Texas
allows a single instance, divorce, in which a court is free to divest,
by unequal partition, the community property interests of one
spouse and vest that interest in the other spouse on equity grounds.
At all other times the vested rights of each spouse in community
property are properly guaranteed, protected and preserved.
Unquestionably the community is meant to be included within a
court's discretionary authority to divide the "estate of the parties"
granted by section 3.63.100 It is significant that Texas decisions have
held that this discretion is very wide, and that the court's division
of community property need not be equal.'' The freedom to make
an unequal division of the community illustrates the severe departure Texas law has taken from the original civil law concept.'"2 The
guiding principle is presumably that of co-ownership with the husband and wife having equal right to wealth accumulated during
marriage. 013 Of the eight community property states, only two
99. E.g., Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970); Taylor v. Catalon, 140 Tex.
38, 41-42, 166 S.W.2d 102, 104 (1942); Wade v. Wade, 295 S.W.2d 939, 940-41 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1956, no writ).
100. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975); see, e.g., In re Marriage of Long, 542
S.W.2d 712, 716-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ); Tullis v. Tullis, 456 S.W.2d
172, 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970, writ dism'd); Dobbs v. Dobbs, 449 S.W.2d 119, 120
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no writ). The authority to "order a division of the estate of the
parties in a manner that the court deems just and right," is given in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
3.63 (Vernon 1975). This authority dates from an 1841 Texas statute. See 1841 Tex. Gen.
Laws, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4, at 20, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 484
(1898).
101. See, e.g., In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712, 717, 719 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1973, writ dism'd); Bryant v. Bryant, 478 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1972, no writ); Roye v. Roye, 404 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966,
no writ). A reversal of the trial court's division requires a showing of abuse of discretion, but
as a practical matter abuse of discretion is extremely hard to prove. See Roberts v. Roberts,
535 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ) (upheld grant of entire community
tract worth $80,000.00 to wife). But cf. Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1974, no writ) (abuse of discretion shown).
102. See generally McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course of Development and Reform, 8 CAUF. W.L. REV. 117 (1971).
103. See Huie, The Texas ConstitutionalDefinition of the Wife's Separate Property, 35
TEXAS L. REV. 1054, 1055 (1957); Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A
Proposal to Revise Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 209-11 (1975). As Justice Steakley
stated, "[Tihe conceptual basis of community property is the notion that spouses should
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and Louisiana,' 5 follow the civil law concept of

equality in division of property on divorce.' 8 In amending its law,
however, California appears to have placed more importance on
removal of the hostility and faultfinding inherent to an unequal
division of property than a desire to return to the principles of the
civil law.'"7 This reasoning is questionable since a marriage in which
allegations of adultery or other charges of fault may be made is
already less than harmonious.'
A more satisfactory basis for a change to equal division of community property is a recognition that fault, age, and earning capacity as well as other equitable matters, are not grounds for the divestment of a cotenant's fifty percent interest in community property
in the partition aspect of a divorce suit.' 0 As mentioned previously,
Texas has always looked to the civil law community property theory
for the foundation of rules governing marital property rights."0
Again, the basic principle is that of a partnership between the
spouses. Some cases have gone so far as to state that a marriage is
essentially equivalent to a business partnership."' There is no disshare as equal partners in the benefits and burdens of the marriage." Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 149 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
104. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4800 (Deering Supp. 1978).
105. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2406 (West 1971).
106. For a general discussion of the various community property states' laws concerning
division of property on divorce see Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A
Proposal to Revise Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 219-21 (1975).
107. See Hayes, California Divorce Reform: Partingis Sweeter Sorrow, 56 A.B.A.J. 660,
663 (1970); Comment, The End of Innocence: Eliminationof Faultin CaliforniaDivorce Law,
17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1306, 1316 n.84 (1970) (quoting Assembly Report 8062).
108. Cf. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977) (abolished interspousal tort
immunity). This reasoning has been approved in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis,
351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (Mass. 1976); Lundberg v. Hagen, 316 A.2d 177, 179 (N.H. 1974); Freehe
v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771, 777 (Wash. 1972).
109. The equitable considerations that may properly be adjusted between the parties,
such as reimbursement for improvements or advancements as distinguished from the equities
that are considered by a divorce court and that result in the taking of a spouse's fifty percent
interest in property, are discussed p. 60-64 infra.
It has been argued by one writer that equal division of marital property is compelled by
the ERA. See Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to Revise
Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 221-22 (1975). This is true, the writer asserts, because
there is discriminatory treatment as a matter of practice. Id. at 221. This point is debatable
since section 3.63 itself does not, prima facie, discriminate in favor of either spouse. Accord,
Schaab v. Schaab, 531 P.2d 954, 957 (N.M. 1974).
110. See p. 47 supra.
111. See United States v. Stapf, 309 F.2d 592, 600 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion);
Rompel v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D. Tex.), rev'd, 326 U.S. 367 (1945);
Newland v. Newland, 529 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ dism'd).
A commentator has likened the theory of dissolution of marriage in California to the dissolu-
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pute that a marriage is a special relationship between two persons
and has characteristics distinct from those of a commercial partnership." ' But these differences provide no basis for the deprivation of
property rights contrary to the constitutional right of due process."'
The ownership characteristics are basically identical between a
business partnership and a marital partnership. In the case of a
business partnership on dissolution, each partner is entitled to his
share of the assets and profits in proportion to the amount invested." 4 The same should be true with a marriage except that the
spouses are treated as making an equal investment. No more support can be given warranting a denial of due process simply because
marriage is a special relationship than can be given because of the
special relationship of parent and child or brother and sister.
EDUCATION, SKILL AND EARNING CAPACITY AS A COMMUNITY ASSET
SUBJECT TO VALUE DIVISION OR TO CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT

The reason Texas lawmakers chose to except marital property
from the general adoption of the common law was to protect the
wife's interests in the marriage." 5 The common law did not recognize the wife's existence except through her husband who became,
upon marriage, the owner of all the wife's property."' The civil
law treated the wife as a co-owner or partner with the husband.
Given this original concern for the rights of the wife in drafting
marital property law, it is not surprising that the effect of the law's
divergence from civil law concepts has largely been to the wife's
benefit. The discretionary division of property has generally been
used in favor of the wife, giving her a greater than equal share of
the community, or even a portion of the husband's separate estate.
This is true, of course, because the husband most often has a higher
tion of a business partnership. Grant, How Much of a Partnershipis Marriage?,23 HASTINGS
L.J. 249, 250 (1971).
112. See Hanzelik v. Hanzelik, 294 So. 2d 116,119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). The dissent
in Eggemeyer emphasized this fact and the state's special interest in marriage as supportive
of a divorce court's power to divest a spouse of property. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d
137, 147-49 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
113. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 (due course of law).
114. Butler v. Thomasson, 256 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1953, no
writ).
115. See Huie, The Texas ConstitutionalDefinition of the Wife's Separate Property, 35
TEXAS L. REV. 1054, 1055 (1957); McKnight, Texas Community Property Low-Its Course of
Development and Reform, 8 CAUF. W.L. REV. 117, 121 (1971).
116. See McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course of Development and
Reform, 8 CAMF. W.L. REv. 117, 121 (1971).
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earning capacity. Frequently, the husband comes into the marriage
with a larger separate estate, at least where his employment career
has already begun. A discretionary division permits a court to consider these and other equitable factors." 7 Therefore any assertion
that the constitution forbids the divestiture of more than fifty percent of the community will be resisted as resulting in hardship and
inequity to the divorced wife. This is particularly the result where
one spouse, typically the wife, has supported the other and put him
or her through college or professional school."' When a divorce occurs shortly after completion of the education there are little or no
community assets to be equally divided. In addition, the separate
property of the wife likely has been consumed for tuition and living
expenses. A decree denying some form of compensation to the comparatively uneducated wife in these situations would indeed be
harsh. Prior to Eggemeyer, the greater education and earning capacity were factors which could be, and were, considered by the divorce
court in making its discretionary division of property under section
3.63. Those considerations could justify granting all available separate property and all community personal property to the wife,
thereby alleviating the hardship." 9 However, if the divorce occurs
very shortly after or during the educational process, the wife is not
substantially compensated since the husband's newly acquired
skills have not yet begun to generate income. If an effective alternative method of compensating the working spouse can be devised
which recognizes the changes necessitated by Eggemeyer, the result
will be a more equitable division of property on divorce.
One method of compensating the working spouse for her interest
in the student spouse's education that has been suggested is to treat
the education as a community property asset subject to division. 20
This would give the wife a fifty percent share of its value. The
117. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 535 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no
writ); Ramirez v. Ramirez, 524 S.W.2d 767, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no
writ); In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712, 717, 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973,
writ dism'd).
118. Even though the wife is not always the spouse who supports the other through
medical or law school she is probably most often the one who does. For this reason references
in the article will be to the wife as the working spouse and to the husband as the student
partner.
119. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 535 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no
writ); Ramirez v. Ramirez, 524 S.W.2d 767, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no
writ); In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712, 717, 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973,
writ dism'd).
120. See Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10
CALIF. W.L. REV. 590, 591 (1974).
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advantage of such a proposal is that the wife is not limited to the
actual cost of the education as would be the case if the expenditures
were treated as an implied loan.' The husband would not be allowed to leave the marriage with an extremely valuable education
asset at the comparatively slight cost of actual tuition expenses and
books.
There is a practical difficulty with treating the education as a
community asset subject to division. Obviously the mind or the
expertise of the student spouse may not be divided physically. One
solution would be to divide the total community property so as to
give the student the value of the education, and grant the wife other
community of equivalent value. As stated previously, however,
usually a couple seeking a divorce soon after the graduation from
medical or law school has few community assets. Nevertheless, the
basic problem is not unique; it is recognized in the typical partition
suit concerning land and cotenants when it may not be possible to
divide the property into equal tracts. In such cases, the court may
grant to one cotenant a more valuable portion, perhaps with improvements, and adjust the imbalance by means of owelty-a lien
or charge on the more valuable tract.' Owelty could certainly be
utilized in a divorce partition by placing a lien on the student
spouse's separate property, or by a judgment lien which could be
asserted as in the case of any other judgment creditor.
A further conceptual problem is that of arriving at a value of this
community property. Unquestionably, it would be hard to fairly and
accurately place a value on the property, but the same is true in
placing a value on pain and suffering, an injured back or a damaged
brain.'2 3 One commentator has suggested two possible formulas. 24
The first, the cost value method, would call for adding the direct
purchase cost and the cost opportunity.'25 Another method, the income capacity value method, would consider the projected earning
121. See id. at 592-97. There would be an evidential obstacle in showing that the funds
were actually loans between the husband and wife. But cf. Padgett v. Padgett, 487 S.W.2d
850, 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (assuming loan without explanation).
122. See Cleveland v. Milner, 141 Tex. 120, 127, 170 S.W.2d 472, 476 (1943); Sayers v.
Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 61-62, 161 S.W.2d 769, 772 (1942).
123. Courts do not hesitate to allow damages in a personal injury action for impairment
of earning capacity. See Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Guthrie, 146 Tex. 585, 587, 210 S.W.2d
550, 552 (1948); McIver v. Gloria, 140 Tex. 566, 568, 169 S.W.2d 710, 712 (1943).
124. Comment, The Interest of the Community. in a Professional Education, 10 CALIF.
W.L. REv. 590, 603 (1974).
125. Id. at 603-04.
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capacity of the student.'2 6 The difficulty in fixing a value on the
education asset should not prevent adoption of an otherwise acceptable method of compensating the wife in such situations.
A major problem is posed, however, in treating the education as
a community asset subject to division. This requires a finding that
the education is a property right. The few courts that have addressed the issue have all rejected the notion that an education is
community property subject to division.'2 7 In Stern v. Stern2 ' the
trial court had referred to an attorney's education and his marriage
to the daughter of a prominent man as "assets." The New Jersey
Supreme Court in rejecting that reasoning stated that "a person's
earning capacity, even where its development has been aided and
enhanced by the other spouse .. . should not be recognized as a
separate, particular item of property ....
"29 In Todd v. Todd 3" the
court reasoned:
If a spouse's education preparing him for the practice of law can
be said to be "community property," a proposition which is extremely doubtful even though the education is acquired with community moneys, it manifestly is of such a character that a monetary
value for division with the other spouse cannot be placed upon it.
At best, education is an intangible property right, the value of
which, because of its character, cannot have a monetary value placed
upon it for division between spouses. 3 '
It is interesting to note that while California refuses to recognize
that education acquired during marriage is community property
subject to division, it does recognize that the goodwill of a professional practice may be community property which is subject to
division in a divorce. 32 The intangible characteristics and difficulty
in evaluation are apparently not considered obstacles in the case of
goodwill. The differing result is questionable and the logic, if any,
is illusive. Texas has reached a contrary decision on the issue of
126. Id. at 604-12.
127. See Todd v. Todd, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134-35 (Ct. App. 1969); In re Marriage of
Graham, 555 P.2d 527, 529 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (N.J.
1975).

128. 331 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1975).
129. Id. at 260.
130. 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Ct. App. 1969).

131. Id. at 134-35.
132. E.g., In re Marriage of Foster, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (Ct. App 1974); In re Marriage

of Lopez, 113 Cal, Rptr. 58, 67 (Ct. App. 1974); Golden v. Golden, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735, 737-38
(Ct. App. 1969); accord, In re Marriage of Lukens, 558 P.2d 279, 282 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
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dividing professional goodwill. 3 3 In Nail v. Nail'34 the supreme court
rejected the idea of granting the wife a share of the value of the
goodwill of her husband's medical practice. 3 1 In arriving at the decision that goodwill was not an earned or vested property right subject
to division, the court distinguished "professional" goodwill from the
goodwill of a business. The former was said to attach to the professional personally as a result of confidence in his abilities.3 6 Going
further, the court said the goodwill of the husband "did not possess
value or constitute an asset separate and apart from his person, or
from his individual ability to practice his profession.' ' 37 Finally, the
court observed that the goodwill would be extinguished by death,
retirement or disablement, sale of the practice or by loss of patients.
All of the arguments offered by the court concerning goodwill apply
equally well to an education asset. It is just as much a right personal
to the owner which is extinguished upon death or any of the other
events. It is interesting to note that the court, in Nail, observed that
it was not considering a case where goodwill was an asset "that may
be an element of damages by reason of tortious conduct.' ' 38 It is
difficult to understand why "goodwill" should be treated as a property right when the husband is being sued for a tort against the wife,
but not a property right that has value when the action is a divorce
suit, very possibly brought about by a tort or other misconduct.
Nevertheless, unless the rationale of Nail can be restricted to goodwill, or is distinguished so as to be inapplicable to education, there
is substantial doubt whether Texas courts will adopt the view that
education is property which may have status as "community"
which is subject to division by the courts under section 3.63.
Significantly, some of the courts that have refused to treat a
community education as property subject to division upon divorce,
have acted to soften the economic hardship to the wife by considering the education of the husband as an equitable factor in the discretionary division of property.'39 The Todd court did not do so
because California statutorily requires an equal division of community. 4 ' The practice in Texas decisions also has been to consider
133. See Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972).
134. 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972).
135. Id. at 764.
136. Id. at 763-64.
137. Id. at 764.
138. Id. at 764.
139. See In re Marriage of Graham, 555 P.2d 527, 529 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); Stern v.
Stern, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (N.J. 1975).
140. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (Deering Supp. 1978).
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the education of the spouses as a factor in making a discretionary
division of property in a "fair, just and equitable," but unequal
manner. "' However, the rationale of Eggemeyer indicates this practice is no longer permitted.
It is apparent that rejection of the idea that a husband's education is community property subject to division avoids a possible
extension of the notion that the increased value of a skill is community property. If the medical or legal expertise the husband has
acquired is treated as community property, then the same classification should be given to the skill the wife has acquired from, and
during the course of, her employment. Her earning capacity has
increased as a result of several years employment. The argument
can be made that there is no good reason to treat the increase in her
earning capacity differently from the increase in the husband's
earning capacity from the standpoint of its classification as property, because in both cases there was joint effort by both spouses.
Consequently, the value of the education or skill acquired by either
spouse should be considered by the court and treated as property
subject to division. It is obvious that any "enhancement in value"
of existing skills as a result of efforts of either or both spouses during
marriage raises the problem of taking such enhancement into consideration in dividing the "property" upon divorce. The difficulties
and problems which flow from treating education as property should
not interfere with the recognition of education as property. Clearly,
the fact that it is an intangible does not detract from its status as
property.
Another approach to a viable solution to the problems resulting
from Eggemeyer is found in the theory of reimbursement.' Basically, reimbursement is an equitable right that arises where one
marital estate has been benefitted by another.' The right may be
a reimbursement for the enhanced value of property where improvements have been erected. " The other circumstance that gives rise
to the right of reimbursement occurs when funds have been ad141. Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 233-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, no writ); Dobbs v. Dobbs, 449 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no writ).
142. See generally Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours-Separate Title and Community
Funds, 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 137 (1969); McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on
Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413, 449-55 (1976).
143. McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413,
450 (1976).
144. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 320, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935) (husband's separate
realty improved with community and wife's separate funds).
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vanced from one estate to another.'45 Reimbursement as a method
of compensating the wife for the husband's education acquired during the marriage is not subject to the practical difficulties that have
been shown to be inherent to classifying education as community
property subject to division. The reimbursement method would not
fall prey to the troublesome extension of the rule to the expertise
acquired by the wife while working. The only funds spent on the
working wife would be for living expenses, and such expenditures
are not reimbursable.'46 Thus reimbursement would properly be limited to community and separate property of the wife expended upon
the husband's education. A college education is not considered a
necessity which a spouse is obligated to furnish. 7
The right of reimbursement permitted in a divorce proceeding is
not inconsistent with the rules governing a typical partition suit
between cotenants. Eggemeyer prohibits divorce courts from divesting separate realty of one spouse and vesting it in the other spouse
on the ground that such equitable factors as diversity of age and
earning capacity require such action. This does not mean that all
equitable considerations are foreclosed. A court partitioning land
between cotenants in a non-divorce proceeding may adjust the equities."'48 The equities that may be considered are those relating to how
the property is to be divided." 9 An example is deciding which cotenant is to receive the improved section of a tract. Reimbursement for
expenditures or improvements is also an equitable remedy granted
in partition suits. 50 Some of the equitable factors which divorce
courts have considered in dividing the property are disparity in
earning power, 5 ' size of estates, age and physical condition, 5 ' future

145. See Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 147, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1943) (community
payment of debt on husband's separate realty).
146. Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 503, 260 S.W.2d 676, 683 (1953); McKnight,
Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413, 450 (1976).
147. Cf. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 487 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972,
no writ) (college education not a necessity husband obligated to furnish for minor children).
148. E.g., Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 61, 161 S.W.2d 769, 772 (1942); Spires v.
Hoover, 466 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Tompkins
v. Hooker, 200 S.W. 193, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1917, no writ).
149. Moseley v. Hearrell, 141 Tex. 280, 283, 171 S.W.2d 337, 338-39 (1943).
150. Cleveland v. Milner, 141 Tex. 120, 127, 170 S.W.2d 472, 476 (1943); Whitmire v.
Powell, 103 Tex. 232, 236, 125 S.W. 889, 890 (1910); Comment, Division of Marital Property
on Divorce: A Proposal to Revise Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 209, 215 (1975). Other
equities adjudged by a court on a partition include an accounting for rents and profits, waste,
fraud and taxes paid. Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 61, 161 S.W.2d 769, 771 (1942).
151. Roye v. Roye, 404 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, no writ).
152. Roberts v. Roberts, 535 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
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need,'5 3 educational background'54 and fault.'55 One court even considered the loss of an advantageous marriage as important in dividing property.' 6 It is these factors which divorce courts no longer
have discretion to consider as a basis for the divestment of separate
property or an unequal value division of community property.
A difficult question arises as to the method of reimbursement to
apply-enhanced value'57 or funds advanced.' 8 The latter theory is
applied when one estate pays a debt or obligation of another estate.
For example, the husband may have purchased realty before the
marriage but still owes all or part of the purchase money. If the
community or the wife's separate estate pays the money due, the
land remains the husband's separate property but the advancing
estate has a right of reimbursement.'59 The right is limited, however,
to the amount actually advanced.' 0 Herein is the disadvantage in
applying the funds advanced theory to money spent on a husband's
education. The potential value of the medical or legal knowledge
acquired is worth much more than the actual cost of acquiring it.
Particularly is this true where a state supported law school is attended. The husband terminates the marriage with something of a
windfall. Of course, a logical argument can be made that the wife
should get no more than what she actually spent and reasonably
should not share in the increased earning capacity of the husband.
One method of allowing the wife to benefit beyond the actual cost
would be to apply the enhanced value theory of reimbursement.
Under this thoery, the reimbursement is for the amount of enhancement at the time of partition, not the original cost.'"' The right of
reimbursement creates no right or title to the property improved,
only a charge or lien on it."62 There is authority that under the
153. Hearn v. Hearn, 449 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no writ).
154. Dobbs v. Dobbs, 449 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no writ).
155. In re Marriage of Long, 542 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no
writ).
156. Roberson v. Roberson, 420 S.W.2d 495, 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1967, writ refd n.r.e.).

157. See Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 320, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935).
158. See Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 147, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1943).
159. See id. at 147, 171 S.W.2d at 334.
160. McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413,
452 (1976).
161. E.g., Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 600, 254 S.W.2d 777, 781 (1952); Dakan v.
Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 320, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935); Ogle v. Jones, 143 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1940, writ ref'd); cf. Sharp v. Stacy, 535 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Tex. 1976) (good
faith improvement to property of third party).
162. E.g., Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 319, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935); Lamar Life
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enhanced value theory the amount of reimbursement is the lesser
of the actual cost or enhanced value.' This limitation may be a
result of recognition that the community receives enjoyment during
the marriage where community funds improve a separate estate 6 '
or it may be based upon the voluntariness of the expenditure where
separate property improves the community. 6 5 There is an additional possibility that when the limitation rule was first expressed
in a supreme court opinion,' 6 only depreciation of improvements
had to be considered.6 7 Imposition of the limitation rule results in
inequity in the situation where a student spouse is put through
school by the other spouse. Limiting the reimbursement to the actual cost permits the student spouse to receive a windfall. Such an
inequitable situation results even though the theory of reimbursement is an equitable rule invented to prevent economic hardship or
unfairness.'66 Courts should not adhere to such rigid rules in the
application of equitable principles.' It should be realized that economic conditions are different today than when the rules of reimbursement were first espoused. In fact, the leading case, Dakan v.
Dakan, 10 from which the limitation rule originated, recognized the
need for flexibility in applying the rules of reimbursement. There it
was stated that courts should be liberal in upholding the doctrine
7
of reimbursement. '
An additional problem exists when relying upon reimbursement
for a solution to the financial hardship of an equal property division.
Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 163 S.W.2d 215, 216-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.);
White v. Hebberd, 89 S.W.2d 482, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1936, no writ).
163. See Girard v. Girard, 521 S.W.2d 714, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1975, no writ); McKnight, Division of Texas MaritalProperty on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J.
413, 451-52 (1976). Contra, Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours-Separate Title and Community

Funds, 21

BAYLOR

L.

REV.

137, 153-54 (1969).

164. McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 413,
452 (1976).
165. Id. at 452.
166. See Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 320, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935). "[I1n case of
reimbursement for improvements, the amount of recovery is limited to the amount of enhancement of the property at the time of partition by virtue of the improvements placed
thereon." Id. at 320, 83 S.W.2d at 628.
167. See McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J.
413, 452 (1976).
168. See Horlock V. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, writ dism'd).
169. McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Propertyon Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413,
452 (1976).
170. 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935).
171. Id. at 318, 83 S.W.2d at 627.
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Early leading cases on reimbursement for improvements used language which referred to reimbursement for funds.'72 A recent civil
appeals case illustrates the harshness of the rule.' A construction
worker used 350 hours of his time and talent in remodeling his wife's
separate house at a substantial savings in cost. The appeals court
held the community was entitled to no compensation for the improvement because no funds were spent.'74 If the husband had instead spent the 350 hours at his job, received wages and then hired
a third party to remodel the house, reimbursement would have been
permitted. Such meaningless distinctions serve no purpose other
than encouraging the marital partnership to employ more extravagant procedures. In the case of a spouse working to provide economic
support for the family and education expenses during the time the
husband enhances his skill, education and earning capacity, there
is no difficulty in classifying the wife's earnings. These are community funds spent on the husband's separate estate and the community is entitled to reimbursement. But as to the husband's efforts, including studying and attending class, no reimbursement
would be permitted. This is true even though his time and work
would have benefitted the community by way of earnings if the
husband were employed instead of enrolled in school. It is unfortunate that this dubious distinction has been carved out of the rules
governing reimbursement. The leading case on reimbursement,
Dakan, contains language supporting reimbursement for labor.
"[T]he community estate must be reimbursed for the cost of the
buildings erected, by joint labors or funds upon the separate property of one of the spouses ...."I"
EDUCATION, SKILL AND EARNING CAPACITY AS SEPARATE PROPERTY

Another approach to a solution to the problem is to translate
"education" or "skill" into a recognition of it as "earning capacity,"
and as a right which belongs to, and is owned by, each spouse as
his or her separate property. Earning capacity is clearly a right
which has been judicially recognized in tort actions to recover for
the value of the loss of it, damage to it or interference with it as a
172. See id. at 317-18, 83 S.W.2d at 627; Ogle v. Jones, 143 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1940, writ ref'd).
173, See Hale v. Hale, 557 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ).
174. Id. at 615.
175. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 320, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935) (emphasis added).
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result of the wrongful acts of others.'76 Courts have had no difficulty
in recognizing that earning capacity is a right which has measurable
value. Earning capacity has also received legislative recognition and
protection in the form of workmen's compensation acts'77 and tort
claims acts.' 8 Significantly, the recovery for loss of "earning capacity during marriage" is specially classified by section 5.01 of the
Family Code as community property.' It can be forcibly argued,
however, that the skill, training or education of a spouse is separate
property. As the Texas Supreme Court held in Arnold v. Leonard,I"
the legislative classification of property as separate or community
is not valid if contrary to the classification required by the application of the constitutional definition of separate and community
property. 8 ' The fact that the courts have created erroneous precedent of long standing is clearly no ground for maintaining it. In
Graham v. Franco'2 the court finally terminated a long line of precedent which erroneously classified the right of a spouse to recover
for tortious injuries to his or her person as community property.'3
Prior case law had reasoned that a cause of action to sue for damages
for a tort was "property within the legal sense of that term."' 4 In
Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Hill 5' the court declared unconstitutional the provisions of article 4615 which made all personal injury
recoveries of the wife her separate property.' The rationale of the
decision was that since the cause of action covered by the statute
was property acquired during marriage by a mode other than gift
or inheritance, it must be classified, on constitutional grounds, as
community property.8 7 The decision, and the rationale supporting
176. See Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Guthrie, 146 Tex. 585, 587, 210 S.W.2d 550, 552
(1948); McIver v. Gloria, 140 Tex. 566, 568, 169 S.W.2d 710, 712 (1943).
177. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 (Vernon 1967).
178. See Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
179. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a)(3) (Vernon 1975).
180. 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925).
181. Id. at 540, 273 S.W. at 802.
182. 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972).
183. Id. at 396.
184. See Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331, 332 (1881).
185. 297 S.W.778 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1927, writ refd).
186. Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W. 778, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso
1927, writ ref'd) (construing Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4615 (1925)). The statute provided that:
All property or moneys received as compensation for personal injuries sustained by the
wife shall be her separate property, except such actual and necessary expenses as may
have accumulated against the husband for hospital fees, medical bills and all other
expenses incident to the collection of said compensation.
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4615 (1925).
187. Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W. 778, 779-80 (Tex. Civ. App--El Paso
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it, were clearly wrong and the decision has since been overruled. 8 '
The statute correctly classified the recovery of such damages as
compensation to the wife for injury to her body, and for the pain and
suffering which she sustained. The New Mexico Supreme Court in
a community property jurisdiction, had so held under a constitutional definition classifying property in a manner similar to that in
the Texas Constitution.'8 9 The court reasoned that the wife owned
her right to personal security prior to marriage; therefore, damages
recovered as compensation for injury to, or interference with that
right belonged to her as her separate property.9 0 Finally, in 1972,
the Texas Supreme Court, in Graham, adopted the rationale of the
New Mexico court and held that the damages recovered by a spouse
for personal injuries had status as the separate property of the
spouse. 9 ' In the final analysis, the status of the property of the wife
is fixed by the provisions of the Texas Constitution and neither the
legislature nor the courts can affect that classification. However, the
court in Graham made an incorrect distinction between recovery for
loss of earning capacity and for other injuries by holding the former
to be community property. 9 ' Unquestionably, a spouse has a cause
of action for recovery of damages to, or loss of, earning capacity.'
It is clearly "a right in a thing" and, therefore, "property." Every
person has, and owns, prior to marriage an "earning capacity." It
is a very personal right which remains the separate property of the
spouse during marriage, and a property right which the person continues to own as separate property upon dissolution of the marriage
by death or divorce. The enhancement of the earning capacity of a
spouse during marriage does not change its status as separate property, though it may result in recognition of equitable claims of reimbursement to the estate of the other spouse or the community.
While the "earnings" generated by the earning capacity of a spouse
during marriage are community property, the earning capacity per
se of a spouse remains separate property throughout the marriage.
Thus, it seems obvious that the portion of section 5.01 of the Family
Code which purports to classify a spouse's "earning capacity during
1927, writ ref'd).
188. See Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. 1972).
189. See Soto v. Vandeventer, 245 P.2d 826, 832 (N.M. 1952).
190. Id. at 832-33.
191. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. 1972).
192. Id. at 396.
193. See Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Guthrie, 146 Tex. 585, 587, 210 S.W.2d 550, 552
(1948); McIver v. Gloria, 140 Tex. 566, 568, 169 S.W.2d 710, 712 (1943).
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marriage" as community property suffers the same fatal constitutional infirmity as other and prior legislative attempts to fix a status
to property of spouses contrary to the constitution.
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT

The decision in Eggemeyer and the subsequent application of the
constitutional limitations on divestment of any kind of property of
the spouses will force trial courts seeking to evolve an "equitable
decree with respect to the rights of the parties" to evaluate the
feasibility of recognizing and enforcing a cause of action in favor of
a spouse for recovery of damages in a "fault" divorce proceeding as
against the other spouse who breached the obligations of the marriage contract. Apparently, no Texas appellate court has rendered
a decision directly on the question of whether such a right is recognizable and enforceable. There have been only a few Texas appellate cases which have considered the question whether marriage is
a contract. Those decisions are not in accord and seem to express
at least three views.
The first view arises from an early decision of the Texas Supreme
Court, in Rice v. Rice,' 4 which espoused the view that in Protestant
countries marriage is almost universally recognized as a mere contract, subject to the control and regulation of the state, and results
from an agreement by and between assenting competent parties. 1 5
Subsequently, the Texas Commission of Appeals, in Wilemon v.
Wilemon, " cited Rice with approval and additionally observed that
"statutes prescribe the grounds upon which that contract may be
dissolved."' 97
The second view, discussed by the Texas Supreme Court in
Grigsby v. Reib, 198 is that marriage is not merely a civil contract
but instead a status created by mutual consent.'99 The court noted
further, without authority, that a "status cannot be created by
contract."""° This is clearly incorrect. There are several examples
of status created by contract, such as those.of principal, agent
194.
195.
196.
197.
writ).
198.
199.
200.

31 Tex. 174 (1868).
Id. at 178.
250 S.W. 1010 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, opinion adopted).
Id. at 1012. See also Edelstein v. Brown, 80 S.W. 1027 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, no
105 Tex. 597, 153 S.W. 1124 (1913).
Id. at 607-08, 153 S.W. at 1130.
Id. at 607, 153 S.W. at 1129.
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and partner. 0 ' The thrust of the opinion is, however, simply the
recognition of "common law marriage." The opinion makes reference to "the excellent opinion" in Ingersol v. McWillie'"' which was
"approved by this court."2 03 Examination of Ingersol reflects the
court's recognition of the rule in Texas that "a marriage may be
valid and binding upon the parties, although entered into not in
accordance with the terms of the statute requiring license and solemnization by a minister or officer."2 4 The other Texas decision
cited by the court in Grigsby in support of the proposition that
marriage is a status rather than a contract is Simmons v.
Simmons, 0 1 which simply held that when competent parties enter
into an agreement to become husband and wife and thereafter live
together in sexual cohabitation holding themselves out publicly as
husband and wife, they have transformed their agreement to marry
into a consummated marriage which the law will recognize. 0 This
traditional common law rationale is analogous to the approach of
equitable recognition and enforcement of other types of oral contracts which are enforced as between parties where there is evidence
of performance, reliance, detriment, consideration and other factors
which evidence the existence of a contractual relationship even
though certain statutory requisites are unsatisfied.2 7
In Gowin v. Gowin 0° the action was brought by the wife against
her husband during marriage to recover damages for cruel treatment, physical and mental pain, and "immaterialization of the pecuniary inducements," all of which she alleged constituted breach
of the marriage contract.2 9 The commission of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the court of civil appeals denying recovery. 10 It should
be noted, however, that the question for decision was carefully
framed and limited to: "Does breach of the marital obligations by
one spouse give rise to a justiciable right in the other of such nature
as that the one may sue for, and recover, damages from the other
201. See Note, 5 TEXAS L. REV. 411, 412-14 (1927).
202. 30 S.W. 56 (Tex. Civ. App.), writ ref'd, 87 Tex. 647, 30 S.W. 869 (1895).
203. Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 607, 153 S.W. 1124, 1129 (1913).
204. Ingersol v. McWillie, 30 S.W. 56, 61 (Tex. Civ. App.), writ ref'd, 87 Tex. 647, 30
S.W. 869 (1895).
205. 39 S.W. 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ), cited in Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597,
607, 153 S.W. 1124, 1129 (1913).
206. Id. at 640-41.
207. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
208. 292 S.W. 211 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted).
209. Id. at 212.
210. Id. at 215.
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as for breach of a contract, in the absence of a divorce or prayer
therefor." '' Subsequently, the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals
in McGlothlin v. McGlothlin,2 cited Gowin with approval and
then, after noting that the suit before the court was brought after a
divorce had been granted and the property rights settled by the
decree, held that since a cause of action for the breach of marital
obligations "did not exist during the marriage, we cannot say that
one was created by the divorce." ' This was simply a conclusion of
the court, with no citation of authority. The court relied upon Gowin
to determine the very question which the court in Gowin emphasized was absent there: Whether a cause of action exists to recover
damages for breach of the contractual obligations of marriage "in
the absence of a divorce or a prayer therefor."2 1 4 Moreover, in
McGlothlin, the suit was brought to recover damages for "alienation
of affection, criminal conversation and loss of consortium" in a separate action instituted subsequent to the judgment in a prior divorce action between the spouses and after the property division as
between the parties had been adjudicated." 5
A third view is that marriage is both a status and a contract. It
is sometimes expressed that "marriage is more than a contract" 1 '
and that "[m]arriage is pre-eminently supported by contract entered into by the parties before the consummation of the status itself
'217

It should be noted, however, that in all of these decisions the
courts acknowledge that marriage is, to some extent, a contract.
This is obviously a correct premise. The parties to the marriage, in
addition to acquiring a status, either expressly or impliedly covenant, promise and agree to do certain acts and things and to refrain
from doing certain acts and things, to undertake certain obligations,
and to assume certain liabilities. The exchange of consideration between the parties is obvious. The contractual relationship, with the
inherent obligations, liabilities and many other legal implications,
is so affected with a public interest that it is not terminable at the
211. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
212. 476 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
213. Id. at 335.
214. See Gowin v. Gowin, 292 S.W. 211, 212 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted).
215. McGlothlin v. McGlothlin, 476 S.W.2d 333, 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
216. Welch v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 356, 207 S.W.2d 627, 628 (1948).
217. Christoph v. Sims, 234 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1950, writ refd
n.r.e.).
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will of the parties but only pursuant to, and in accordance with,
statutory prerequisites. Courts and legislatures in the United States
have consistently referred to the decree of divorce as a judgment
which dissolves the bonds of matrimony. A bond is ordinarily understood, and defined, as a binding agreement or covenant. Thus, while
marriage is a status, it is certainly also a contract. Texas courts
should recognize and treat it as such.
The old and specious argument that the recognition of a claim for
breach of the marital contract would promote marital discord is the
same reasoning that was finally discredited and spurned by the
Texas Supreme Court in Bounds v. Caudle1 ' in discarding the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity."'9 If a happy marriage exists,
20
there will be no reason to assert the cause of action.1
There is no reason predicated on grounds of public policy that
should preclude the recognition of a cause of action on behalf of a
plaintiff spouse to recover damages from the defendant spouse in a
divorce proceeding based on the "fault" of the defendant spouse,
arising from breach of the contractual agreement, duties and obligations, and the termination of the reasonable pecuniary expectations
that would be attributable to the full performance of the marriage
contract. Neither is there any public policy basis to preclude the
divorce court from including appropriate provisions in the divorce
decree to subject the property of the defendant spouse to the satisfaction of such a claim which has thus been adjudicated with full
due process of law. In fact, the recognition that such a cause of
action and right of recovery exists, and will be enforced, would have
the effect of providing a stabilizing force to help deter a spouse from
abandoning the contractual obligations of a marriage. Such a policy
would clearly be in furtherance of the public interest in the encouragement of the preservation of marriage as a basic social institution.
At the same time, it would recognize the right of a spouse to recover
damages for breach of the contract of marriage in like manner as the
law now recognizes the right of one spouse to sue and recover damages from the other spouse for breach of any other contract. Courts
in Texas recognize and enforce the right of spouses to contract with
each other, 2' and afford them the same rights and remedies as any
218. 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977), noted in 10 St. Mary's L.J. 205 (1978).
219. Id. at 927.
220. Id. at 927.
221. See, e.g., Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967); Griffin v. Griffin, 535
S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ); Coggin v. Coggin, 204 S.W.2d 47, 53
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1947, no writ).
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other contracting parties would have.222 One writer has observed
that it is illogical to recognize a right of action to recover damages
for breach of all other contracts except the contract of marriage." 3
Last but not least, such a policy would provide an effective legal
basis which courts in fault divorce proceedings could utilize to accomplish the desire to render a decree which will effectively evaluate, adjudge and enforce the full rights and remedies to which the
plaintiff spouse is legally and equitably entitled.
CONCLUSION

For over one hundred years Texas divorce courts have been confused by the heavy influence of common law policy, rules and remedies applicable to the property rights of spouses in divorce proceedings, and have been frustrated by a public policy prohibition against
permanent alimony. At the same time, there has been a continuing
effort by the trial courts to make adequate provision for the post
divorce economic welfare of the spouses based on the court's determination of their relative age, physical and mental condition, education, skills, earning capacity, wealth and many other "equity factors." In doing so, the courts established considerable precedent
which purported to authorize a trial court in a divorce proceeding
to make any division of, and to transfer any or all rights in, the
community estate of both parties and the separate estate of either
party, without regard to the nature or extent of the ownership rights
of the parties. Divestment of property was not ordered in satisfaction of legal obligations established under due process of law, but
rather in the exercise of the trial court's discretionary finding that
it was "just and right." The recent decision of the Texas Supreme
Court in Eggemeyer is a "lighthouse case" in which the court emphasizes that constitutional protection of property rights is a basic
requirement in any order affecting the property rights of parties in
a divorce proceeding. It shows a need for new approaches to a more
effective solution to an old and subsisting social problem. The constitutional provision which the supreme court in Eggemeyer held
222. L. SIMPKINS, SPEER'S TEXAS FAMILY LAW § 22:42, at 509-10 (5th ed. 1976); see, e.g.,
Vickers v. Vickers, 553 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ) (enforced
consent judgment which made husband pay taxes and utilities of wife's residence); Wilson
v. Woolf, 274 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (wife had
right to specific performance of contract with husband); Coggin v. Coggin, 204 S.W.2d 47, 54
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1947, no writ) (judgment on note for money loaned by wife to
husband).
223. 0. SPEER, MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS § 111, at 152 (4th ed. 1961).
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prohibits a trial court in a divorce proceeding from divesting title
to separate realty out of one spouse and vesting it in the other spouse
in the exercise of its power under section 3.63 of the Texas Family
Code is equally applicable, in the same manner, to the separate
personal property of a spouse, and also to the undivided one-half
interest which each spouse owns as community real or personal
property. All property is equally protected. The court's determination, in Eggemeyer, that the only "estate of the parties" which a
trial court has jurisdiction to divide under section 3.63 is community
property, clearly removes any statutory basis for a trial court to
"divide" any separate personalty. Aside from the constitutional prohibition, it is illogical to conceive of an implied power to "divide"
property except as between joint owners. Since separate property is
owned solely by a spouse it does not have the characteristic of jointly
owned undivided interest which must exist for a valid "division" or
partition of property rights. It seems logical, therefore, to construe
the jurisdiction of the trial court, under section 3.63, to be confined
to a division of the community real and personal property in the
same way as a trial court would be compelled to divide by partition
the property interest of other joint owners. Thus construed and
applied, the language of section 3.63 does not authorize a court to
make an unequal division of such property because of "equity factors" such as differences in the age, earning capacity or financial
position of the parties. The statute requires "a division . . . in a
manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for
the rights of each party . . . ." Properly construed, the statute
provides that the trial court shall be guided by equity concepts and
principles in determining the manner in which the division of the
community estate will be made, but that in doing so, the court must
insure that the property rights of each spouse in and to an undivided
one-half interest in such community estate are duly protected and
preserved in such "equitable" division.
Earning capacity is a right which belongs to a spouse as separate
property. Damages recovered for injury to, interference with or loss
of earning capacity are properly classified as separate property and
are distinguishable from damages recovered for loss of earnings of a
spouse during marriage which constitute community property. That
portion of section 5.22(a) of the Family Code which classifies the
earning capacity of a spouse during marriage as community property is an unconstitutional attempt by the legislature to fix the
status of such property contrary to that which it has under the
constitutional definition as separate property. The increase in edu-
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cation and skill and the resulting enhancement in value of the earning capacity of a spouse during marriage by use, or at the expense
of, the separate funds or property of the other spouse or the community labor, funds or property creates an equitable right of reimbursement which a divorce court may recognize and enforce in its
decree. The court, applying the rule that reimbursement is purely
a matter of equity, has discretion to consider the cost to the estate
which made it possible to enhance the earning capacity, the benefits which will accrue to the spouse whose earning capacity has
been enhanced, and the benefits to, and received by, the community estate of both spouses during their marriage by virtue thereof.
In the divorce decree which dissolves the marriage, the court
should consider utilizing the various means and approaches which
are available to the court to effectively grant appropriate relief with
respect to interspousal claims, such as partnership accounting principles, reimbursement, equitable partition, owelty, equitable liens,
injunctions, receivership, judgment liens and other collection remedies and procedures applicable and available in ordinary debtor and
creditor relationships. If the interspousal claims are properly asserted and adjudicated in the divorce proceeding, there seems to be
no reason why such a judgment on such claims could not be enforced
as against any non-exempt property of the debtor ex-spouse in the
same manner as against any other debtor. This approach would
avoid the constitutional problem which arises from a direct divestment or an unequal division of property as a mode of "equitable
division of the property of the spouses," and would also conform to
the constitutional requirement of due process, or course of law, as
a condition for the taking of property under article I, section 19 of
the Texas Constitution.
Marriage is both a statug and a contract. In a "fault" divorce
proceeding, the trial court should recognize a cause of action for
damages for breach of the express and implied contractual obligations of the marriage contract and provide for the recovery thereof.
The adjudication of such a claim along with all of the other claims
and matters pertinent to the dissolution of the marriage would enable the trial court to effectively evaluate, adjudicate and enforce
all rights, claims, and remedies, legal and equitable, between the
spouses. Such a policy is urgently needed, would serve the public
interest, and should be recognized and implemented at the earliest
opportunity.
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